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PREFACE
As part of NASA's responsibility to encourage and facilitate active exchange of
information and ideas among members of the aviation community, an Aviation
Safety/Automation workshop was organized and sponsored by the Flight Management
Division of NASA Langley Research Center. The one-day workshop was held on
October 10, 1989, at the Sheraton Beach Inn and Conference Center in Virginia Beach,
Virginia. Participants were invited from industry, Government, and universities to discuss
critical questions and issues concerning the rapid introduction and utilization of advanced
computer-based technology into the flight deck and air traffic controller workstation
environments.
The workshop was attended by approximately 30 discipline experts, automation and
human factors researchers, and research and development managers, The goal of the
workshop was to address major issues identified by the NASA Aviation Safety/Automation
Program.
This report documents the results of the workshop. The ideas, thoughts, and
concepts were developed by the workshop participants. The findings, however, have been
synthesized into a final report primarily by the NASA researchers. The use of notes and
taped recordings of the sessions facilitated this documentation. Many thoughts and
concepts have been summarized so as not to identify any comment or thought with a
particular individual or organization. This format was chosen to facilitate a free exchange
of information and ideas at the workshop.
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INTRODUCTION
'Fhc National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has initiated the
Aviati_m Sat'ety/Autonlation Program to address tile research and development of human-
ccntcred automation which would assist humans to attain increases in performance within
the flight deck or ATC workstation, to monitor human performance, to detect and warn
of human errors, and to manage contingencies.
To encourage effective communication and the exchange of ideas with the aviation
community, a workshop was conducted to address three major issues identified by the
program. These issues were (l) the measurement and evaluation of situation awareness,
intent, and performance; (2) functional validation of automated systems, especially
AI/expert systems; and (3) successful completion of the program considering the need for
technology transfer. The workshop's participants were divided into three parallel sessions
to address these questions, then brought back together in a plenary session.
The Situation Awareness Group was asked to identify effective means of measuring
and evaluating situation awareness, crew/controller understanding, anticipation, intent, and
performance. They were also asked to consider complacency, vigilance, and boredom, and
to identify voids in the research knowledge base. With the belief that increasing levels
of technology and automation will be employed in the flight deck and controller
workstations, the ability to define and evaluate the effects of automation on situation
awareness has long been desired.
The Functional Validation Group was asked to identify the level of functional
validation of automation concepts/expert systems developed within the program that should
be achieved. The methodology to obtain this level would also be identified. Guidelines
and protocols are also needed to evaluate the performance and performance limits of
knowledge-based systems. Methods are required to assure that an intelligent, automated
system will not command an operating mode that could cause the system to deviate from
its safe operating envelope.
The Technology Transfer Group was asked to discuss effective means of technology
transfer and how a successful completion of the program could be realized. Simulation
and flight demonstrations of research results as a means of effective technology transfer
were also discussed. It is desired that the research products from this program be utilized
by the aviation community, so candid discussions of past successes and failures were
encouraged.
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[IltroOuction
The Situation Awareness group was asked to address tile issues of measuring and
assessing Situation Awareness, crew/controller understanding, anticipation, intent, and
performance. With the belief that an increasing level of automation will be brought to
the cockpit, it is important to be able to measure and assess these concepts so that
meaningful evaluations of human interaction with specific automation concepts can be
made.
Background
tlistorically, the term "Situation Awareness" primarily has been associated with
attitude awareness, or, in the military, with knowing the relative positions, speeds, and
directions of flight of friendly and hostile aircraft during a tactical battle. Today, however,
Situation Awareness has taken on a much broader definition.
Definition: Situation Awareness consists of two components: (1) the operator's
knowledge of the current physical and tactical environment; and (2) the process or strategy
by which the operator switches attention to the multiple tasks being performed in order
to keep that knowledge up to date.
The specific physical and tactical aspects of Situation Awareness must be defined
explicitly for the specific task environment. Generally, the physical environment will
consist of X and Y position (longitude and latitude), altitude, aircraft attitude, heading,
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speed, and other task-specific items. The tactical environment is highly task specific and
could include such things as fuel remaining to fly to an alternate airport, height above
ground, time to make a heading change, or altitude at which to level off. Situation
Awareness is by its very nature an inferential process on the part of the operator, it is
not merely a collection of information coming in to the operator, but an active process
by which the human operator infers concepts/mcxtels from the information coming in,
organizes them, and combines them in various ways to perform necessary tasks. The
process involves reducing the data down to as simple a level as possible. For instance,
if the operator knows that the flaps are at a certain setting, the slats are extended, and
the landing gear is down, then the airplane is in a "landing configuration." Generally, this
is all that is needed; however, at other times more specific information may be needed.
Situation Awareness should be considered to be a useful heuristic that allows us
to focus on the different kinds of psychological activities and properties that are tractable
to the researcher. Therefore, explicit definitions of these psychological activities or
properties being investigated should be stated clearly in the research description.
Operational Considerations
The flfllowing operational aspects of Situation Awareness were identified:
(i)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Aircraft Path in Space (Navigation, Lateral Position, Vertical Position);
Aircraft State (Fuel, Sub-system, Configuration);
Position with Respect to Other Traffic (Terminal Area Operations,
Sequencing on Airways); and
Communication (Air Traffic Control, Company, Passengers).
Situation Awareness Issues
The following issues were identified as critical:
(1) What is a useful definition of Situation Awareness?
(2) What procedures or techniques should be used in measuring Situation
Awareness?
(3) Should Situation Awareness be measured as an absolute quantity or
as a change from a previous level?
(4) Are there different types of Situation Awareness, and if so how does
one know that the correct type of Situation Awareness is being
measured?
(5)
(6)
(7)
What is the nature of the relationship between Situation Awareness
and Performance?
To what degree do Automatic systems give the operator feedback to
enhance Situation Awareness?
When a simulation scenario is stopped to obtain subjective evaluation
of Situation Awareness, can the simulation scenario be continued or
should it be stopped, and a new scenario started?
Possible Measurement and Evaluation Techniqu_
Crew/Vehicle Assessment
Aircraft flight path deviation
Frequency of control inputs
Latency in achieving navigational goals
Accuracy of following procedures
Errors
Response Time
Subjective Responses (Questionnaire, Rating Scales)
Workload Assessment (Physiological, Subjective, Performance)
Visual Scan
Perfi_rmance History
ASRS Database
Error Rates
Questionnaires/Surveys
Flight path error
Subjective Opinion
Specific Situation Awareness Assessment Techniques
Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT)
(Endsley, 1988)
The foUowing methods were identified for evaluating of specific situational
awareness concepts:
(1) Problem solving research paradigms (Errors, Slips, Mistakes, Response
Time Latency, Anomaly Detection Accuracy, Decision Making,
Judgment);
(2) Questionnaire (Quantitative, Situation Queries, "What If' Queries);
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(3) "Workload" Measurement Techniques (Physiological, Subjective,
Performance); and
(4) Visual Scan (Eye Point-of-Regard).
_w_Controller Understanding
A definition of Crew/Controller Understanding was not agreed upon during the
workshop, however, one possible definition was submitted prior to the workshop as "the
extent to which any messages or instructions between the crew and the controller are
understood as the sender meant to convey them". Crew/Controller interaction is one of
the sources of Situation Awareness. It is analogous to other information sources, such
as displays, aural cues, alerts, warnings, and information from other crew members.
Many of the same measures used for Situation Awareness could be applied to the
Crew/Controller Understanding Issue. In addition, the following measures should be
considered:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Compliance with Commands;
Response Latency;
Accuracy in Interpreting Messages;
Types of Errors;
Information Transfer Rate; and
Questionnaire.
Anticipation
To some extent, the degree to which a pilot or other operator can anticipate and
prepare for seemingly unexpected events is another measure of Situation Awareness.
Two types of activities were discussed which help the crew anticipate events: preparatory
processes and communication. In a preparatory process, the crewmembers anticipate
their own needs and prepare for those future needs either overtly or covertly. Most h_rms
of training are overt, while mental rehearsal, in which a crewmember uses periods of
relative inactivity to mentally rehearse upcoming tasks and to consider possible
contingencies, is covert. A serious research problem remains in that it is very difficult to
detect and quantify covert preparatory processes, which actually increase "off-peak"
workload temporarily, and to correlate these processes to better task performance.
Communications, either with or between other aircraft and Air Traffic.Control (ATC), can
also help the crew anticipate future workload demands and prepare properly. It was
mentioned that the use of DataLink may have an impact on this source of information.
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Intent
With regard to system knowledge of operator intent, it was proposed during the
workshop discussion that intent inferencing is best described as maintaining or improving
the Situation Awareness of the aircraft systems and automation. For the automation to
effectively carry out its assigned duties, it needs to be aware of much of the same
information as the operator. In addition, it needs to be aware of what the operator is
doing now, how this fits into his overall goal, and what he plans to do in the future.
While this level of understanding does not exist in current cockpits, its development may
be necessary to provide the forms of advanced decision aiding envisioned by many. A
simpler form of intent inferencing may be possible using eye point-of-regard, so that the
system can provide the information it determines the crewmember is seeking.
It is also interesting to note that pilots in current-generation aircraft are doing
intent inferencing themselves with respect to the automation. Questions such as: "What
is the system doing now?" "What is it going to do next?" "Why is it doing that?" are
frequently cited as examples of the difficulty of maintaining good Situation Awareness.
Summary_
A working definition of Situation Awareness was presented in which Situation
Awareness was conceptualized as consisting of two components: (1) the operator's
knowledge of the current physical and tactical environment; and (2) the process or strategy
by which the operator switches attention to the multiple tasks being performed in order
to keep that knowledge up to date. Because of the inferential nature of Situation
Awareness, it cannot be quantified directly, and must be derived through the measurement
of other parameters. A number of the possible measurement and evaluation techniques
were presented.
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Introduction
The Functional Validation Group was asked to address issues concerning the level
of validation (functional only) that should be achieved in the Aviation Safety/Automation
Program for the new automation concepts produced.
The remainder of this report describes the scope of the specific issues that were
addressed by the working group, the stakeholders in the validation process for the
Aviation Safety/Automation Program, validation as consensus, and the evaluation process
for new automation concepts.
Definition of Functional Validation and Scope of the Working Group
Validation is an extensive process. It involves defining the requirements for a given
problem, and from those requirements deriving a solution. One concern is determining
whether the correct problem is being solved; i.e., whether the requirements are correct
for the problem. Verification is the process of determining whether the solution concept
satisfies the requirements. Although this group was tasked to address the entire validation
process, the entire process was considered too large to address in the given amount of
time. The group decided, therefore, to focus on the question of verification: assuming that
the set of requirements is given, how should the solution concept be verified? Two aspects
of verification for concepts, such as the ones developed in the Aviation Safety/Automation
Program, are research evaluation (often involving human-in-the-loop experiments) and
FAA certification. The outputs of the evaluation are important inputs to the certification
process. Although the group discussed certification, the emphasis was placed on the
evaluation process. The group also decided that consideration of the evaluation of
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advanced automation concepts was more appropriate, rather than a particular technology
such as artificial intelligence.
The Stakeholders
The group decided that identification of the stakeholders in the validation of
Program outputs was important. The outputs of the Program are: (l) guidelines; (2) early
warnings of technology considerations; (3) technologies and concepts; and
(4) methodologies for validating those technologies and concepts.
The stakeholders in the validation of Program outputs were determined to be
NASA, airframe manufacturers, airlines, the FAA, and the public. The lines of
communications among the stakeholders are depicted in Figure 1.
Public I
NASA
I Airframe I -"Manufactur rs -
Figure l. Aviation Safety/Automation Program Stakeholders and Lines of Communication.
Validation A.s Consensus
The group observed that the current approach to validation of new automation is
a consensus-building process, rather than a formal proof, because formal proofs are not
possible. Therefore, regardless of the approach taken to show that a concept meets the
requirements, the hope will be for the relevant stakeholders to conclude with a consensus.
The consensus is developed iteratively. First the developers must convince
themselves that the concept is satisfactory. Sometimes this can be done by analytical
means, and sometimes just by interacting with the concept. This ability to use interaction
as an alternative is important because analytical means are not always available. The next
step usually involves broadening the circle of consensus to include other stakeholders. This
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processcontinues until all relevant stakeholdersare satisfied that the concept is viable.
During this process, it is often realized that the concept has limitations. These limitations
are noted, but there is often enough consensus to proceed with the process. This is very
different from a proof.
E v_u_at_!i.o_n_t.o_c_e_
The evaluation process is iterative, as shown in Figure 2. Functional validation does
not occur at any one point in the process. Rather, functional validation is the entire
process of formulating the problem to determine requirements, developing a solution, and
gaining experience with the solution concept. Some of the initial experience is gained
while developing the initial solution concept. Ongoing experience is gained during the
entire evaluation process. This type of evaluation process may be even more important
for concepts that use artificial intelligence (AI) technology, because suitable analytical
evaluation techniques are often lacking.
The question remains of how much of this evaluation cycle is necessary before the
solution concepts can be transitioned to the user. Addressing this question is the research
goal of full-mission simulation tests i'n which the research concept is compared to some
baseline. It was strongly noted that part-task simulation is a very important step but is not
sufficient. Although part-task simulations are important, full-mission simulation is necessary
to test the interaction of the concept with other parts of the overall system. This
interaction and integration with other parts of the system is particularly important to the
FAA, because a major focus of that agency is to examine how a new concept interacts
with the existing system.
problemformulation
I oo, 14-
solution concept[
F experience(initial vs ongoing)
Figure 2. Evaluation Process.
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Although full-mission simulation was agreed upon as a minimum for functional
validation, not all the workshop participants agreed that it represented the end of the
evaluation process.No consensuswas reachedamong the group members regarding the
needfor flight test.Flight testswere viewed asincreasingthe confidencein someconcepts,
while being of little help in others. For example,a flight test could not be conducted in
which an actual fault was introduced to test a fault management system such as
Faultfinder. The group agreed that it is important to remember that flight tests are not
intended to prove the absence of errors in a system, but rather are intended to increase
confidence in a system. For some solution concepts, flight tests may be necessary to gain
the desired level of confidence.
A very important point made in the working group was the importance of involving
the potential customers (primarily the airframe manufacturers) very early in the research
process. It was considered inappropriate to fully develop and evaluate a concept, and then
expect the users to incorporate it into their systems. The problem that arises is that the
organization will not be familiar with the concept and will not understand its capabilities
and limitations. It was believed to require a great deal of effort to transfer a concept if
there is no early involvement.
The utility of the experience gained in the evaluation process relies heavily on
scenarios. It was observed that it is important to remember that as scenario complexity
increases, the cost associated with developing and using the scenarios increases. Cost also
increases as the set of scenarios is enhanced to achieve increased coverage. Therefore,
there is often a tradeoff between scenario complexity and coverage. Often the evaluation
is designed to a fixed cost level, so some compromises may be necessary. If the concept
is determined to be viable in this limited evaluation, it is then placed in an environment
where it will receive ongoing use. This use contributes to the ongoing validation of a
soluli_m.
Summary_
The working group identified the stakeholders in the validation of concepts and
technology produced by the Program. These stakeholders included the airframe
manufacturers, the FAA, the airlines, and the public. The group agreed that the current
approach to validating automation is a consensus building process, rather than a formal
proof of correctness, because a formal proof is not possible. It was agreed that a
consensus building process will also apply to functional validation of the Program concepts,
and that some of this will occur during the evaluation of the concepts. The evaluation will
be an iterative process, and should include taking concepts to full-mission simulation at
least. The group noted it is highly desirable for the potential customers of the Program
concepts, especially the airframe manufacturers, to be involved early in the research and
evaluation process The group also observed that the utility of experience gained in the
evaluation process relies heavily on the scenarios used.
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The Program Success and Technology Transfer group was asked to address the
issue of defining means by which to assess the success of the program and to enhance
technology transfer.
The group discussed the fact that there are basically two ways of measuring the
success of research programs. One is through assessing the impact of research products
and the other is through assessing the quality of the work being performed. Implicit in
the concept "technology transfer" is the assumption that a program's life-cycle is more or
less linear and that the various program products can impact current problems in aviation
safety as well as influence future generation aircraft and systems designs. The
interdependency between program success and technology transfer is complex and the
timing of the assessment is crucial for arriving at a sought-after answer. For example, it
may well be that we can get different answers to the question, "are we successful ?", one
year from now, at the end of the program's budget cycle, or ten or more years from
today. In addition to these maturational considerations, the various types of program
products may call for differential treatment in terms of their relative suitability for transfer
(or measurement of success).
The group suggested that the most effective means for accomplishing the transfer
of research products is directly tied to the degree of movement of people and information
among and between industry and government agencies in this country. Several specific
solution paths for successful technology transfer were discussed in light of a cursory
analysis of current impediments. These are detailed in a later section.
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B_hlttA_ts Transferred?
Traditional transfer vehicles, such as NASA Technical Memoranda or other
journal-type reports constitute a traditional style of information transfer but were judged
by this group as relatively unsuccessful in terms of having near term real-world impact.
More recently, software tools, when used and applied by NASA "customers" to their own
R & D efforts, are becoming an immediately sought after product that can be easily
disseminated to the relevant players in the community. These products can have an
important impact upon future developments.
Fully engineered systems and designs as end-products are most closely linked to the
term "technology", but the working group felt that, in the human factors arena at least,
systems constitute more of a methodology embodied in a set of tools rather than unitary
end-products that can be adopted "as is" for use in the operational aviation community.
In fact, human factors contributions to the research and development store of accumulated
system knowledge (simulations were included in the discussion) is by nature difficult to
assess and transfer ("when the best human factors work is done nobody notices, only when
problems arise, i.e., something goes wrong, are human factors people called upon").
A primary way to fi_restall these adverse forces is to ensure that human fi_ctors
professionals are an integral part of the research and development process.
Interdisciplinary working teams made up of representative experts from both government
and industry were thought to be the optimal vehicle for accomplishing effective technology
transfer.
lmpediment:_ to Technolo6.w Transfer
Several impediments to technology transfer exist, including economic constraints,
socio-historical factors, and domain-inherent limitations that hinder rapid, transfer progress.
Economic Forces.- Like other companies, the airline industry is basically
economically motivated. Manufacturers will build what their customers, the airlines,
demand. Different customers will pose different requirements since the cause-effect link
between good design and accident rate is so precarious. In the absence of hard data
derived from comparing "design A" with "design B" in terms of their respective potential
for producing differential human error rates, the customer will state his requirements
based on cost, subjective preference and/or tradition, as well as other, hard-to-track,
criteria. NASA must therefore invest time in educating all the customers, especially the
airlines.
Criticality of a potential error is also an important consideration in the success of
new designs. For example, "tuning radio frequencies" was mentioned to illustrate that
mistakes are made all the time, but that the potential cost of a redesign in this domain
far outweighs the perceived benefit. The economic impact of design on pilot training or
training of maintenance personnel deserves attention. A design idea may not be able to
be "sold" based on good human factors principles; however, if one can show that savings
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may be achieved in the training area with the particular design, the idea will be popular
and likely to be adopted.
Measurability. - A measurement problem exists when discussing human factors
variables. For example, which features in an avionics display lead to incidents/accidents
in contrast to those which are simply annoying? It is also difficult to get accurate baseline
measures on everyday mistakes in the cockpit. Pilots are generally very good at catching
most of the errors that result from suboptimal design. In general, if one can show (in
high fidelity situations) that a feature will reduce the number of incidents or errors, this
constitutes sufficiently compelling evidence to convince both the customer and the
manufacturer that this is something they want and need. On the other hand, a simple
"study" based on some "academic" theoretical considerations is likely to be ignored by the
aviation community.
Research and measurement in the training process was also suggested as an indirect
vehicle for measuring the "goodness" of automation. Several U.S. carriers are following
the trend started by their European counterparts of hiring ab-initio-pilots out of necessity.
If a type of design can help a pilot with little experience make fewer errors, then the
automation design will be deemed successful by the airlines. In other words, cockpit
human factors must be tailored to address issues that will reduce training requirements
(hence cost) for the inexperienced pilot.
Socio-Historical Forces. - Research and development in the aviation community
is still largely driven and dominated by the aerodynamics and structural engineering
contingent of the airframe manufacturers and not by the end user, the pilot. Only
recently has there been a perceived shift among customers benefiting the avionics side.
Next generation aircraft are still being specified primarily in terms of structures and
propulsion and not in terms of crew performance and cockpit design. If early human
factors considerations arise, they are certainly heavily outweighed and overshadowed by
their more influential "metal-bending" counterparts.
One factor that may seriously affect human factors efforts and the Aviation Safety
Automation program in the next several years is public opinion. It was pointed out that,
at the current rate of growth in the airline industry, the worldwide accident rate, in terms
of sheer numbers perceived by the public in only 5 years time, may be as high as one
major accident every 3 weeks. The present day culprit "human error" will continue to
arise as a causal factor, and public outcry may demand more "human factors"
consideration.
Type-Rating and Training. - The airlines presumably want their pilots to have type
ratings that cover all the aircraft in their fleets. Yet, airlines will resist new avionics
technology if it increases the likelihood of errors when pilots transition back to older
technology aircraft. This line of reasoning was felt to be the case even if a "better
mousetrap" was available. If there were an increased effort to standardize aircraft types
(by manufacturer at least), then there would be an improvement in the ease of
transferring technology.
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Incompatibility wi_b Ground Control.- Another major impediment to continued
progress in cockpit technology is the incompatibility between the sophistication of available
cockpit technology and the technology used by ATC. This mismatch is thought to be
responsible for defeating much of the potential benefits derived from innovative cockpit
research such as advanced flight management systems concepts.
Proprietary_ Information. - In order for innovative ideas and methodologies to
fh,urish it is important to exchange information freely. A major stumbling block to the
free flow of information between government research labs and the aviation industry
(avionic and airframe manufacturers) is the proprietary nature of advanced information.
Mutual benefit can be derived if the manufacturer allows government personnel access to
their research labs and NASA invites manufacturer pers0nnel to participate in their
research endeavors. This interchange would go a long way toward developing mutual
education and training and ensure relevancy.
Strategies for T_chno!ogy_ Transfer
A list of potential research products is given in Table 1. These should have an
impact on improved training and accident prevention. It should also be noted that the
transfer of products or methodology can each have an impact on air transport operations.
Products accomplish this simply by being adopted, whereas methods and data influence
how future technology actually gets developed.
Table I" Program Products to be Transferred
CATEGORY SPECIFIC ITEMS
Information
Technology
Methods & Methodologies
Guidelines
Candidate Designs
Technical Support
Tools, Measures, Data, Tactical Support
Systems, Designs, Hardware
Reports, Software, Expert Systems
Training, Operational Design
Early Prototypes
Expertise through People Exchange
Training Impact. -The research products that have an impact on training are very
important to the airlines because a reduction in training due to automation translates
directly into cost savings.
Accident Prevention. - Accident prevention is another important area since it is
a concrete issue and usually gets the backing of everyone: the manufacturers, the airlines,
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and the pilots. It is therefore recommended that human factors research should always
strive to demonstrate improvements and/or recovery from known accident cases.
A related topic addresses the awiilablc research infrastructure. The aviatkm
c_mununity should strive to standardize scenarit_s used in the evahmli_m and testing of new
idcas, equipment and procedures, if this element in the research envir_mmcnt wcrc fully
intact and scenarios could be widely shared by the various research houses, large strides
in obtaining relevant relatable data could be made. The availability to any researcher of
simulators with standardized operational scenarios based on critical accident data to test
technology issues is vital to having an impact on safety.
Early Involvement of People. - In order to ensure that research products reach
their destination it is important to explicitly define NASA's potential customers. The
research effort must involve these people at all phases to ensure technology transfer.
Involvement of these people in the research effort allows immediate feedback as well as
immediate dissemination of results. It also develops an advocacy group to bring
knowledge to the uninformed and reluctant. Table 2 lists the potential technology transfer
points in the aviation research arena.
Table 2: Technology Transfer Points
Transport Aircraft Manufacturers (domestic and foreign)
Business Aircraft Manufacturers
Avionics Manufacturers
Airlines (domestic and foreign)
Pilots (ALPA, APA)
Transport Associations (ATA, IATA)
Controllers (NATCO, ATCA)
Standards, Regulation, Certification (FAA, CAA, etc.)
Research Community (Academic and Industrial Standards)
Military Aviation (DOD)
Safety Boards (NTSB)
Past successes in human factors technology transfer have resulted from close
cooperation between researchers and the airline pilots or the airlines, i.e., the end user.
',Standardize" Research Among Centers and Industry. - Besides facilitating effective
dialogue, the development of standardized, compatible facilities and jointly developed
scenarios and methodologies will greatly enhance productivity. A tool kit of various
simulation modules, scenarios, and data collection tools can be assembled by NASA and
others for exchange so that research methodology does not need to be re-invented every
time an issue is to be investigated. At the moment considerable research energy is spent
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on getting the necessaryresourcesup and running rather than dealing with solutions to
key issues.
Joint use research Ihcilities with very high fidelity, two-crew, flight deck operations
in realistically complex ATC simulations are needed to gather data for research with
_lctuai line pilots. In order to make a substantial impact on the aviation industry a need
exists to establish an entirely new way of working together. NASA can facilitate the
development and cooperation of joint working teams among industry and government.
Such cooperation would be a very effective way to exchange information in a timely and
informed manner and will result in accomplishing a large amount of necessary work in the
shortest possible timeframe.
Joint National Research Teams.- Working in the framework of a national research
unit is of benefit to all participants since better ideas are generated, people get fully
trained, and investigators will take lessons learned back to their own institutions and
companies. This model is borrowed from the Japanese but may be successfully applied
to our own situation in the United States on any project or program with national scope.
Table 3 shows the proposed distribution of personnel during a program's life cycle.
During the problem definition phase it is important to involve all interested parties.
Soluti(,ns should be proposed by a smaller interdisciplinary group of experts and
prototyping and testing should occur by a selected group of experts (solution authors) in
a ccmsortium-type contract arrangement.
Table 3: Process for NAS Technology and Transfer
INVOLVEMENT
PARTICIPANTS
PROCESS STEP SMALL
SELECTED ALL GROUP TEAM
NASA AND Problem Definition X
INDUSTRY
Propose Solution X
Prototype & Test
Lessons Learned
Technical Support
INDUSTRY Application of Solution X
X
X
The main message of this research model is that technology simply can not be
planned from Ix_int A to point B, rather it is people who provide the critical element for
making technology transfer happen. A well defined government/industry program with
clear problem definitions can have a much bigger impact than just another program plan
based on past government-industry relationships.
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Qther Suzgestions
Group discussions included a host of other related issues. These can be categorized
primarily into necessary preconditions for success of the program and specific suggestions
for dealing with currently perceived shortcomings. Five global preconditions are listed
in Table 4.
Table 4: Preconditions for Program Success
Clear and Commonly Agreed Upon Goal Statements
Economic Incentives (Industry) and Motivation (Problem Criticality)
Measurement Technology (Standardized Environment Must Exist)
Ease of Interaction (Modern Media and Management Support)
Stable Funding (Commitment by All Parties)
Simulator Working Group. - Several points of confusion exist on how to maximize
the value of simulation research. Standard methodologies are lacking and there is a sense
that we could obtain a lot more information out of simulator research than we are
presently achieving. A working group should be initiated to discuss these issues and to
look at the various simulation projects and facilities, their respective capabilities and
methodology. This working group should arrive at guidelines for achieving a high degree
of standardization and compatibility between government and industry research facilities.
Airline Focus Meetings_. -The perception of various NASA outsiders is that there
is a noticeable gap between the research being performed and the operational aspect of
transport aviation. To overcome this perception it is suggested that NASA hold regular
meetings with the airlines as a focal point where the researcher-participants' task is to
really understand what the airlines are saying about the various operational problems.
The airlines would identiQ and prioritize their issues and explain to the researchers the
operational problems they are facing. The recent ATA National Plan To Enhance
Aviation Safety Through Human Factors represents a positive step in this direction. The
two points emphasized in relation to this suggestion were that (a) the technical researchers
should participate and (b) there should be a thorough sampling of airline participants,
not just a rotation of a small select group.
Information Exchange. - Several means for enhancing the information exchange
infrastructure were discussed. Specific suggestions to stimulate heightened information
exchange included the publication of a newsletter with joint contributions from industry
and government researchers working on a specific problem (having one specific mandate).
An electronic version of this newsletter could also be made available. Innovations such
as hypermedia could serve to make demonstrations and news items an extremely
stimulating and interesting forum.
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The general notion of portability of software and hardware was also mentioned as
a potential enhancement to information exchange and, therefore, technology transfer. We
basically need to find better ways to share things quickly. "Share-ability" of information
in the applied human factors domain is somewhat problematic since industry has
proprietary concerns and many researchers outside specific avionics or manufacturing
companies are not sufficiently informed about plans for next generation technology. What
is basically needed is information access, compatibility and portability of software
("software speaks louder than words") and hardware to achieve a spirit of cooperation.
The present state of affairs can be characterized as a general willingness to cooperate but
lacking the necessary focus and some vital pieces of the necessary infrastructure.
Asking for Feedback. - One of the most obvious but often neglected ways of
measuring success is to ask for feedback directly. NASA could seek critical feedback by
exposing research ideas to the aviation industry. While the current structure of the
Aeronautical Advisory Committee does some of this, it is primarily program oriented and
therefore does not provide specific technical critique desired by the researchers.
One possible vehicle for this kind of feedback is for NASA to send out survey
questionnaires on a fairly regular basis asking for opinions from industry on how much
impact NASA-sponsored work has had on them or how helpful NASA reports have been.
Technology transfer in this sense becomes clearly a two-way path.
Summary
Human Factors Research by its nature is more difficult to track and evaluate than
its engineering and technology counterparts. Multiple products exist that are candidates
for "transfer", these range from avionics system concepts and designs to research
methodologies and software tools. Progress on all of these fronts will result in a
cumulative success path, i.e., have immediate and eventual impact on the National
Airspace System (NAS). To enhance this process i t is important to be flexible and
responsive to voices from the operational community. People and expertise sh0uid be
developed along with technoiogy. NASA can play an important role in facilitating free
information exchange and a spirit of cooperation that will help create the appropriate
climate necessary for technology transfer to occur.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A one-day workshop was held to address three major issues identified by the
Aviati_m Sat'ety/Aut_unati_m Prc_gram. Three groups were formed to address each issue.
The first issue concerned lhe measurement of situation awareness. It was determined that
situation awareness can nt;Jt be measured directly, but must be inferred from parameters
that are measuring human performance. The development of test scenarios that explicitly
address the level of situation awareness in question was deemed to be very important.
The second issue concerned the functional validation of automation technologies
and concepts. It was agreed that a consensus-building process should be applied to
automation concepts developed within the Aviation Safety/Automation Program, and that
some of this will occur during the evaluation of the concepts. The evaluation will be an
iterative process and should include taking the concepts to full-mission simulation at least.
It was also agreed that the experience gained in the evaluation process relied heavily on
the quality of the test scenarios.
The third issue concerned the transfer of research products to the aviation
community. It was determined that the research products take various forms, including
information, tools, technology, methods, guidelines, and candidate designs. Several
impediments to technology transfer of human factors research products were identified;
economic forces, ability to measure safety benefits, historical forces
(aero/propulsion/structures disciplines have been and are the major drivers). The group
noted that past successes in human factors technology transfer have occurred when close
cooperation existed between researchers and the airframers/airlines.
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APPENDIX A
SITUATION AWARENESS-CRITICAL PHENOMENON OR ILL-DEFINED CONCEPT?.
Nadine B. Sarter and David D. Woods
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
Ohio State University
Introduction
Situation awareness is supposed to be an essential prerequisite for the safe
operation of complex dynamic systems. Especially in the aviation domain, the term has
become one of the most fashionable performance-related concepts since recent accidents
and incidents have triggered concerns about the potentially disadvantageous effects of
cockpit automation on situation awareness. This problem is being addressed by major
research plans (e.g., National Plan to Enhance Aviation Safety through Human Factors
hnprovements, ATA, 1989; Aviation Safety/Automation Research Plan by NASA, 1988)
and reflected by research findings like the following (adapted from Wiener, 1989):
11. In Lhe B-757 auLomation, t.here are
things thaL happen that surprise me.
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One of the major reasons for the impact of automation on situation awareness is
seen in the associated changes of level and timing of feedback. Whereas manually flying
a plane provides immediate low-level feedback of the consequences of each input,
automated systems involve longer time-constant feedback loops. Pilots are informed about
the system's state and behavior at a very high level of overall outcome of a variety of
activities. Maintaining awareness becomes difficult as the evolution of situations and the
cwerall mission is no longer perfectly transparent.
Despite the concept's popularity, a widely accepted definition of situation awareness
is still missing. Processes involved in achieving and maintaining it are not yet completely
understood. Surprisingly enough, research is already going on that aims at imprcwing
situ_ltion awareness by designing new cockpit systems and displays.
This paper is an attempt to fill the above-mentioned gaps by (a) looking at the
cognitive basis of situation awareness; (b) giving special consideration to the meaning of
the term "awareness", which is critical for developing appropriate assessment and
manipulation techniques; and (c) suggesting possible new approaches to the investigation
of situation awareness.
The Concept of "Situation Awareness"
Both the commercial and the military aviation community have proposed a variety
of definitions of situation awareness. The following list presents some examples to illustrate
their differences in abstraction level and degree of comprehension. Those aspects referring
to the definition of "awareness" are underlined.
(1) "...the pilot's _ about his surroundings in light of his mission's
goals..." (Whitaker and Klein, 1988)
(2) "...It means that the pilot has an integrated unders_tanding of factors that will
contribute to the safe flying of the aircraft under normal or non-normal
conditions..." (Regal et al., 1988)
(3) "...the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of
their status in the near future..." (Endsley, 1988)
(4) "...where: spatial awareness (the pilot's knowledge of his location in space
and of the spatial relationship between objects)
what: identity awareness (the pilot's knowledge of the presence of threats
and their objectives and the pilot's awareness of system state variables)
who: responsibility or automation awareness (knowledge of who is
charge)
in
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when: temporal awareness(knowledge of the occurrence of events as the
mission evolves)..." (Harwood et al., 1988)
(5) "...the pilot's knowledge of:
(a) where both friendly and enemy aircraft are and what they are
doing
(h) what the pilot's flight knows and what the flight's options are
for offense and defense
(c) what other flights know and what their intentions are
(d) what information from above is missing..." (McKinnon et al.,
1986)
These definitions, as well as most others in the aviation literature, basically address
two issues: (a) the essential components and (b) the temporal dimension of situation
awareness.
Components of Situation Awareness
Pilots need to pay attention to a large amount of data from a variety of sources
in their environment such as cockpit instruments, other crew members, and the plane's
vicinity. Many definitions of situation awareness try to define in detail which part of this
information is critical for the pilot. Such efforts suffer, however, from the fact that, in
dymlmic environments, the relewmce of data depends on their context and will therefore
wiry within and between flights "as a function of specific task, the environment, and the
tactical objective" (}lamilton, 1987).
Rather than specifying the essential components of situation awareness, it seems
more important to understand what factors may affect the acquisition and processing of
data in general and how they can be counteracted. Factors that would deserve further
consideration in the aviation context are, for example, lowered alertness as a consequence
of vigilance decrements and fatigue or the effects of time pressure:
Vigilance decrements are known to occur after as little as 20 minutes into
a task and may cause such problems as narrowing of perceptual focus or an
increasing number of attention lapses that in turn result in missing data.
However, it is not yet clear whether this concept is only true in the context
of simple monitoring tasks or whether it also holds for complex environments
like the flight deck.
Fatigue can result in, for example, the loss of cohesive perception; i.e., the
pilot perceives all relevant data one by one but can not integrate them to
an overall picture of the situation. With increasing fatigue, the pilot may
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also have difficulty in accurately recalling previous flight events when
required.
While most definitions of situation awareness only talk about the need to be aware
of available data it can be as fatal not to notice that some information is missing. If the
pilot erroneously assumes that he is on track he may run into trouble if he actually needs
missing information in an emergency situation when time constraints do not allow him to
search for it.
Temporal Dimension• of Situation Awareness
In dynamic environments like the flight deck, minor deviations or failures that are
uncritical in themselves may evolve and interact over time to become a major threat.
Therefore, it is important to observe them, keep them in mind, and integrate them over
time. Recurrent self-contained and isolated situation assessments are not sufficient. The
go_d must be an active model of the world that is continuously updated in accordance with
ongoing events and trends. Temporal awareness is important for understanding and
solving problems that are caused and influenced by precursors in the past. It is also
essential fi)r the prognosis and prevention of potential problems in the future on the basis
of available data (see Endsley, 1988; Harwood et al., 1988). The following figure sketches
some scenarios that require temporal awareness in order to cope with an existing or a
future problem:
PAST PRESENT
PILOT
PREC(s) _ PROBLEMA1
PROBLEM A2.
FUTURE
-41---DIAGNOSIS
PREC(S) Crucial PREC
t PRE'C(s)
PAEVENT]ON
.-_PQOeLEM
.... --_PR_BLEM
PRC_
(PREC-Precursor)
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As indicated by the figure, problems can evolve in a variety of ways, such as:
A single problem may be caused by several precursors, occurring either at the same
time (case 5) or one after the other (cases 2 and 6). One single precursor can
result in multiple problems (case 1). A variety of precursors may not be critical in
themselves but cause a problem if one additional crucial event happens (case 4).
Or the pilot may be confronted with a conglomeration of problems related to
different precursors in the past (case 3).
Coping with one major, instant-onset, notified failure has been investigated to some
extent and is part of every pilot training. The temporal aspect of more subtle and complex
scenarios, however, has been largely neglected up to now. Incident reports and discussions
with airline pilots indicate that this aspect does not correspond with its importance for
aviation safety. Thus, it will be important to look at the risk potentials of the outlined
scenarios.
Cognitiv¢ Processes Underlying Situation Awareness
While many authors try to be specific in determining the important components of
a "situation", they avoid explicitly defining the term "awareness" which is often simply used
synonymously with expressions like "knowledge", "integrated understanding", or "internal
model of the world" (Endsley, 1988). A more thorough analysis of the phenomenon is
necessary for its investigation and manipulation.
Situation awareness is based on recurrent situation assessments and the integration
of their results over time. Situation assessments have been defined as "a complex process
of perception and pattern matching greatly limited by working-memory and attentional
capacity" (Endsley, 1988). This process is supposed to involve three different levels:
Level I Perception of situational elements
Level II Based upon schemata, i.e., knowledge structures stored
in long-term memory (Rumelhart, 1984), which are
activated by recognized patterns in incoming data, the
pilot forms a holistic picture of the situation in working
memory (Wickens, 1984; Fracker, 1988). This picture
determines his further information search and attention
allocation (Hayes et al., 1977).
These processes require a high level of expertise which
has been defined as "highly developed repertoires of
pattern-oriented representations" (Chase and Simon,
.1973).
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Level III Projection of future status and actions of situational
components This level is commonly referred to as
'"oeing ahead of the plane", which-from an aviation
safetypoint of view-should be the main objectiveof all
research and training efforts.
A varietyof problemsaffecting information processing (e.g., distractions, biases) can
occur at all levels and would result in inadequate or incomplete situation assessments. But
even if the pilot manages to overcome all potential problems and to adequately assess the
situation, it still has to be determined when the resulting knowledge can be called
"awareness."
The. Definition of "Awareness,'
Adequate situation assessments provide the pilot with valuable knowledge about his
flight. Still, knowledge does not in any case imply awareness. There is an ongoing debate
about the question:
Is awareness equivalent to actually conscious knowledge (which would
suggest that only information in primary/working memory should be
called aware (see e.g., Anderson, 1983)) or does it comprise any
knowledge than can potentially be retrieved when necessary (as an
activated subset of long-term memory)?
This question refers to the distinction between consciousness being a "state" or a "stage"
(see Kiatzky, 1984).
In the context of situation awareness, it seems to be inappropriate to refer to
awareness only as information in working memory, i.e., information "currently under
attentional focus" (see Klatzky, 1984). A definitkm of situation awareness has to account
for requirements like the above mentioned temporal aspect. A comprehensive active
model of the world that is continuously being updated can hardly be stored in short-term
memory, which is assumed to only hold a very restricted amount of information. Our
understanding of situation awareness will therefore comprise any information that is
potentially available and can be activated when relevant in order to assess and cope with
a situation.
The practical reason for bothering with situation awareness is the hope to help
maintain or even increase aviation safety. This hope is based on the assumption of a
positive relationship between situation awareness and performance. Besides the fact that
such a relationship has not yet been established, it is important to keep in mind that pilot
performance is based on both fact and skill knowledge. This also makes it questionable
to require "awareness of knowledge" in the sense of "conscious knowledge." Theories of
memory and awareness postulate that only fact knowledge can be(come) conscious
whereas "procedural knowledge structures [skill knowledge] guiding thought and action
are unconscious" (Kihlstrom, 1987). The same problem is addressed by the distinction
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between"explicit" and "implicit" memory.Using this different terminology,Schacter(1987)
postulatesthat "implicit memory [skill knowledge] is revealed when previous experiences
facilitate performanceon a task that doesnot require consciousor intentional recollection
of thoseexperiences;explicit memory [fact knowledge] is revealed when performanceon
a task requires consciousrecollection of previous experiences."
The abovestatementsimplicitly postulate an all-or-none rule of awareness.Cowan
(1988) suggeststhat insteadof a dichotomy, there may rather be a continuum: "Activation
must exert a certain threshold before it becomespart of awareness."
Based on the precedingdiscussion,our understanding of situation awarenessis as
follows:
Situation awarenessrefers to any knowledge-regardlessof its actual level of
consciousness-thatcanbe activatedand adequatelyprocessedwhen required
in order to cope with a situation.
This phrase is not meant to be a concise definition of situation awareness. It is far
too vague for that purpose; however, it can serve as a basis for an operational definition
of the phenomenon in the context of specific studies.
The Assessment of Situation Awareness
The most adequate approach to investigating situation awareness in the aviation
domain seems to be the staging of complex dynamic scenarios by means of full-mission
simulation. This approach avoids problems of laboratory studies, for example, simplistic
tasks and tools or the consideration of isolated awareness components which question the
validity and applicability of results. Still, it involves difficult issues like the following:
i. Selection of Situations
The selection of situations to be staged on the simulator should be
driven by a predefined phenomenon of interest (like the concept of situation
awareness) in order to focus in on specific questions rather than generally
observe pilots' performance. The challenge is to translate the phenomenon
from general psychological terms to a domain-specific relevant scenario. At
this stage, domain experts need to be involved in order to end up with a
realistic task that is embedded in a credible overall scenario in order to
motivate pilots and to get valid results.
2. Adequacy of Assessment Techniques
Up to now, situation awareness has been investigated by using either
indirect approaches (e.g., performance measurements) or direct methods
(e.g., freezing techniques, debriefings; see Endsley, 1989; Marshak et al.,
1987).
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The problem with performance measures is that a direct relationship between
performance and awareness has not yet been established. Therefore, it is questionable to
simply infer the degree of awareness from the pilot's behavior. Performance measures may
be the only possible method to assess implicit skill-related memory as it is supposed to
influence behavior without ever reaching the state of consciousness. Eich (1984) postulates
that implicit memory can never be revealed in tests that require intentional remembering,
for example, in a debriefing. Still, performance measures need to be supplemented by
other techniques.
The application of direct measures is likely to be intrusive and thereby
counteracting efforts to be as realistic as possible (e.g., "partial report procedures"
involving the "blanking of displays" as used by Endsley, 1988). Or it involves after-the-fact
data collection in a debriefing that may yield misguiding results because it requires
context-free retrieval of information. Another potential problem of debriefings is that they
can be used to rationalize or justify behavior during the experimental run rather than
describe and explain it.
Promising Alternative Approaches.
We would like to suggest alternative approaches to the investigation of situation
awareness. First of all, some modifications with respect to former scenario character and
implementations may be helpful:
(i) The investigation of situation awareness requires the introduction of
unnotified, subtle, slowly developing, and interacting problems instead
of the usual instant-onset failure that is immediately indicated by an
alarm. The latter can serve to investigate pilots' decision-making and
problem-solving performance. But if situation awareness is the topic
of interest, it is also important to test ihe pilot's ability to realize the
existence of a problem in the first place.
(2) The simulation should last for quite a long period of time in order
to allow for the realistic evolution of a complex situation that can
serve as a valid touchstone for the pilot's situation awareness. A
longer scenario will also provoke vigilance decrements that are likely
to impair situation awareness and to reveal consequences on
performance. In addition, it will help to give the pilot a better chance
to adapt to the simulator.
(3) In order to guarantee the regular occurrence of all scenario events,
it will be advantageous to work with a "confederate." In former
studies, standard scenarios were most often achieved by manipulating
the situation from outside the simulator. But more complex scenarios
involving combinations of minor problems with deliberate omission
and commission errors require the assistance of a "cooperating pilot"
30
who initiates scenariofeaturesand who can also assistin probing the
pilot's situation awareness.
The assessment of situation awareness should be carried out during the
experimental run in order to avoid the above-mentionedproblems related to debriefings.
It will be necessaryto develop and test in-flight probing techniquesthat are not unrealislic
and intrusive. They have to focus in on knowledge that is relewmt for the pilot at the
time of the probing. Otherwise, there is a risk of erroneously diagnosing"unawareness",
just because the requested knowledge is, in general, available to the pilot but not
sufficiently activated at this time. Adequate probing techniquesshould addressdifferent
information processingstages involved in situation assessmentsin order to find out at
which stageproblems occur.
Some candidate techniquesare:
Effacing specific data from displays when the pilot can be expected
to pay attention to them instead of totally blanking the display
Asking the pilot for previously displayed information by calling him
as ATC, as his company, or by addressing him as a crew member
Having the copilot ("confederate") discuss a problem with the pilot
in order to find out about his situational knowledge
- Freezing important indicators
Introducing unnotified aircraft in his vicinity that require
collision-avoidance activities in order to test for environmental
awareness
It will be essential to come up with failures, deviations, or errors that require
immediate, well-defined, corrective actions or information search; otherwise there will be
the same discussions about the appropriateness and necessity of expected behavior that
emerged in the context of workload and performance studies. Again, the cooperation with
domain practitioners will be crucial in order to adequately collect and interpret the
experimental data.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper emphasizes the need for analyzing the cognitive processes underlying
situation awareness in complex dynamic worlds. We need to identify and understand the
nature of actually existing problems in order to move beyond the current trial and error
approach to improving situation awareness.
31
This implies that instead of further discussionof what should be the contents of
awareness,researchshouldconcentrateon the question how to assessand manipulate the
potential availability of information and knowledge.
The second part of the paper suggests that full-nlission simui_tion will be the key
to investigating information processing in complex dynamic worlds, but that traditional
simulation approaches need to be modified in order to effectively address critical research
issues. The most important methodological goal is to develop nonintrusive in-flight probing
techniques to focus in on specific information-processing stages.
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